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I. INTRODUCTION
Jeremy Bloom, an Olympic Gold-Medal skier, wanted to play col-
1. University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Miami School of
Law; B.A. 2010, University of Miami. I dedicate this paper to Paul T. Dee, Esq. who sadly passed
away before my article could be published. Despite battling illness, Professor Dee went above and
beyond to help me with the completion of this article. Others will rightfully remember Professor
Dee for what he did as General Counsel and Athletic Director at University of Miami, but I will
always remember him as an adviser, mentor, and friend. I would also like to thank my family, my
roommates, and my girlfriend, for without their support and assistance, I would still be trying to
come up with a topic to write about.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
lege football at Colorado University, but he did not want to give up on
his pursuit for another gold medal. NCAA rules, however, restrict stu-
dent employment and promotions which forced him to choose between
the two. Bloom had to abandon college football so that he could cover
the necessary costs of continuing to pursue his dream of being an
Olympic skier.'
Darnell Autry was a Northwestern Football player who aspired to
be a movie star. Autry was fortunate enough to be selected for a role in a
commercial film. However, the same NCAA rules that forced Bloom to
choose between skiing and football prevented Autry from being able to
receive any compensation for his role in the film.3
Aaron Adair was a prospective baseball player for Oklahoma Uni-
versity who, prior to beginning to play college baseball, went through
battles with cancer, battles with a debilitating stomach ailment, and the
death of his father. To help cope with his struggles, Adair wrote a book
describing his battles. His story inspired readers all over the world, but
not the NCAA. Again, the NCAA's employment restrictions had found
yet another victim. Since Adair used his name and reputation to promote
his book, he was forced to abandon his dreams of playing college
baseball.4
Each of these students faced a difficult decision, with just two
options. First, they could have pursued their ambitions. But in doing so,
they would collide with NCAA regulations. Specifically, NCAA bylaws
outlaw any remuneration of the student athlete based on the student's
reputation, fame, or publicity5 and prohibit student athletes from using
their names or pictures in advertisements or promotions.6 Bloom vio-
lated these bylaws by receiving endorsements for skiing. If Autry would
have received money for his participation in the film, the use of his
image would have violated these NCAA bylaws. Lastly, since Adair's
book had his name and image on the cover, he was found to violate
these NCAA bylaws.
The second option available to them was to abandon their other
career goals and continue pursuing a profession in their collegiate sport.
2. Bloom v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
3. See Laura Freedman, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA Amateurism
Rules, 13 FORDHAM I, TELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 682-83 (2003) (citing Mark Brown,
Autry Sues NCAA Over Film Role, CHI. SuN-TvnEs, Apr. 3, 1996, at 108).
4. Christian Dennie, Amateurism Stifles A Student-Athlete's Dream, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 221,
235-37 (2005) (citing Interview with Aaron Adair, Former Student-Athlete, University of
Oklahoma, in Norman, Okla. (Oct. 26, 2003)).
5. NCAA, NCAA 2009-10 NCAA DIviSION I MANUAL, art 12.4.1(b), at 72 (2011),
available at http://www.ncaapublications.con/p-422 4 -2011-2012-ncaa-division-i-manual.aspx
(last visited Jan. 16, 2012) [hereinafter NCAA Manual].
6. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art. 12.5.2.1(b).
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Bloom would have had to give up being an Olympic skier, Autry would
have had to walk away from his aspirations to be a movie star, and Adair
would have had to cancel the publication of his book. The option of
abandoning alternative career options seems even more ominous for stu-
dent athletes when one considers how few of the NCAA student athletes
actually become professionals in their sport. The NCAA's student web-
site paints this picture clearly, stating: "There are over 400,000 student
athletes, and just about every one of them will go pro in something other
than sports."7
To further this unfairness, college players must sign away their
rights to profit off their own names and likenesses to the NCAA and the
member institutions.8 The limitations on profiting off college athletes'
names and images are far less restrictive when the college the player
attends, the NCAA, or even third parties use them. NCAA bylaws allow
member institutions to use the student's name, picture, or appearance to
promote the school and the athletic events.9 The NCAA may use the
name or picture of any student in order to promote NCAA champion-
ships, events, and programs."0 NCAA bylaws even allow third parties to
use student athletes' names or images either when they are acting on
behalf of the NCAA 1I or when used during advertisements of private
businesses to congratulate players on their achievements. 2 Yet, while
others gain large profits from the athlete's names and images, 13 the ath-
letes themselves have no rights or abilities to do the same.
This Comment will examine the inconsistencies surrounding the
NCAA bylaws on amateurism and the restraint that they place on the
players' right to profit off their name and image. This will be done
through an analysis of the employment restrictions placed on student
athletes by the NCAA. Part II will discuss the various ways that the
NCAA maintains the amateurism of its student athletes. 4 This section
7. The NCAA's major ad campaign over the last few years has been one featuring student
athletes first on the playing field, and then, later, showing them participating in some other form
of employment. NCAAstudent.org, Watch TV Spots, http://ncaastudent.org/ (last visited Jan. 16,
2012); see also, Robert A McCormick, A Trial of Tears: The Exploitation of the College Athlete,
11 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 639 (noting the strangeness of the NCAA's choice of marketing and the
true goal of "masking" the true status of student athletes).
8. NCAA, Form 08-3a Academic Year 2008-2009, available at http://www.ukathletics.com/
doclib/compliance0809_sa. statement.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Form 08-3a].
9. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art. 12.5.1.1.
10. Id. at art. 12.5.1.1.1
11. Id.
12. Id. at art. 12.5.1.4.
13. In the year 2009-10, NCAA revenue was $749.8 million. Revenue, NCAA, http://www.
ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Finances/Revenue (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
14. See infra Part II.
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will discuss the NCAA's history 15 and bylaws relating to amateurism. 16
Part III will focus specifically on how the NCAA restricts college ath-
letes' rights to profit off of their names, images, and reputations. 17 This
section will discuss the NCAA's restrictions relating to employment18
and the forms student athletes are required to sign to participate in inter-
collegiate athletics. 19 Part IV will contain an antitrust analysis of the
employment restrictions. 20 This section will begin with a brief history of
the Sherman Antitrust Act2' and its past applications involving the
NCAA.22 Then, a rule of reason analysis will be performed on the
NCAA's employment restrictions which will demonstrate that NCAA
Bylaw 12.4 constitutes an anticompetitive agreement. 23 Part V will com-
pare the employment restrictions on student athletes with students who
are not under the control of the NCAA. 4 Lastly, part VI will conclude
that the employment restrictions violate antitrust law and lead to a sug-
gestion that the restrictions must be lifted.25
II. NCAA AND AMATEURISM
"I think you would compare the NCAA to Al Capone and to the
Mafia .... I think they're just one of the most vicious, most ruthless
organizations ever created by mankind."
Illinois Rep. Bobby Rush 2 6
A. History of NCAA
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was created
out of necessity. Before the NCAA's creation in 1905, cheating scan-
dals, lack of rule enforcement, and serious injuries plagued intercollegi-
ate sports. Even in one of the first intercollegiate athletic events, a
regatta between Yale and Harvard Universities, allegations of cheating
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part JI.B.
17. See infra Part HI.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV.A.
22. See infra Part IV.B and Part IV.C.
23. See infra Part IV.D.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part VI.
26. Associated Press, Bobby Rush Compares NCAA to Mafia, ESPN, Nov. 2, 2011, http://
espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7177833/illinois-congressman-bobby-rush-compares-ncaa-
mafia. Congressman Bobby Rush made these accusations at a forum organized to examine the
impact of "back-room deals, payoffs and scandals" in college sports. Id.
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caused controversy.2 7 Yale accused Harvard of cheating by using a cox-
swain who was not a student at Harvard.28 Such difficulties in oversee-
ing matches between schools led to the formation of the first athletic
conferences and eventually to calls for a formation of a national organi-
zation to monitor and control college athletics. 29 However, it was not
until President Theodore Roosevelt called for a national conference in
response to the growing number of deaths and injuries resulting from
intercollegiate athletics that a national organization would be formed.3 °
On December 28, 1905, sixty-two universities joined together to
form the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States
("IAAUS")3 1 and established a principle of amateurism at the heart of its
constitution.32 In 1910, the IAAUS switched to its present name, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA").3 3 Initially, the
NCAA was solely a discussion group and rule-making body, but in
1921, the NCAA organized its first national championship, the National
Collegiate Track and Field Championships 4.3 Gradually, more sports fell
under the rule-making control of the NCAA, as did the number of sports
having national championships.35
After World War 11, college attendance skyrocketed, resulting in an
increased interest in intercollegiate sports. Also during this time, televi-
sions became a mainstay in the majority of family homes, leading to
increased pressure to broadcast intercollegiate sporting events. Concern
with the growing attendance numbers and how television would affect
attendance, the NCAA enacted the Sanity Code which would be
enforced by the Constitutional Compliance Committee. Although the
purpose behind the Sanity Code was to "alleviate the proliferation of
exploitive practices in the recruitment of student athletes", the Constitu-
tional Compliance Committee lacked the proper enforcement methods.3 6
The 1950s was a time of great change for the NCAA. The Sanity
Code was repealed and the Constitutional Compliance Committee was
replaced by the Committee on Infractions (COI). The COI was given
27. MATHEW J. MrrrEN ET AL., Sports Law and Regulation: Cases, Materials, and Problems
100 (2d ed. 2009).
28. Id. The coxswain is the person on the rowing team who is in charge of the boat.
29. Id.
30. Id. In 1905 alone, there were over 18 deaths and 100 major injuries in college football. Id.
31. History, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/
who+we+are/about+the+ncaa+history (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
32. MrIrEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 101.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. For example, the first basketball Championship was held in 1939. Id.
36. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 102. In fact, the only enforcement power that the
Constitutional Compliance Committee had was expulsion. This penalty was so severe and so
reluctantly used that it essentially left the Constitutional Compliance Committee powerless. Id.
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much greater sanction authority and became far more willing to exercise
this authority.37 The NCAA also recognized that with the growth of the
NCAA in terms of member institutions and exposure, a central leader
was needed to run the NCAA.3 The NCAA named Walter Byers as the
executive director of the NCAA in 1951 and established a NCAA head-
quarters in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1952. 39 Byers immediately
strengthened the NCAA, specifically its enforcement division, and nego-
tiated the first television contract to televise college football games.4"
The NCAA continued to grow at a rapid pace with member institu-
tions diverging away from one another in terms of sports emphasis.4 ' In
response, in 1973, the NCAA divided the member institutions into three
Divisions: I, II, and 111.42 Eventually, Division I would be divided into
two subdivisions, namely Division I-A and Division I-AA.43 In the
1980s, the NCAA would begin to expand to include women's sports.'
Today, the NCAA consists of 1,273 member institutions45 with over
400,000 student athletes. 46 Further, the NCAA oversees eighty-nine
championships in twenty-three different sports47 and has become a mul-
tibillion dollar a year enterprise.48
B. NCAA Bylaws Dealing with Amateurism
From its very beginnings, the primary principle behind the NCAA
was amateurism. The IAAUS bylaws created in 1906 outlined what the
association felt the principles of amateurism were and required members
37. Id.
38. History, supra note 31.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also, MrrFEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 102. The television contract was worth over
$1 million. Id. This contract would eventually be found to violate antitrust law. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984) (holding that
schools must be allowed to negotiate their own television contracts, any restriction by the NCAA
was considered an antitrust violation. The court reasoned that restraints on football telecasts did
not maintain competitive balance but rather imposed a restriction on one source of revenue that
was more important to some schools than to others.).
41. History, supra note 31.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Composition and Sport Sponsorship of the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM_GLOBALCONTEXT=/Ncaa/ncaa/ababo+the+ncaa/membership/
membership-breakdown.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 1,066 are active member institutions. Id.
46. Who We Are, NCAA, http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/
who+we+are+landing+page (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
47. Id.
48. Revenue, supra note 13. For 2009-10, NCAA revenue was $749.8 million, most of which
came from the final year of a rights agreement with CBS Sports for March Madness. Id.
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to "enact and enforce" measures which were necessary to prevent viola-
tions of these principles, including:
a. Proselyting [sic]
1. The offering of inducements to players to enter Colleges or
Universities because of their athletic abilities, and of sup-
porting or maintaining players while students on account of
their athletic abilities, either by athletic organizations, indi-
vidual alumni, or otherwise, directly or indirectly.
2. The singling out of prominent athletic students of prepara-
tory schools and endeavoring to influence them to enter a
particular College or University.
b. The playing of those ineligible as amateurs.
c. The playing of those who are not bona-fide students in
good and regular standing.
d. Improper and unsportsmanlike conduct of any sort what-
soever, either on the part of the contestants, the coaches,
their assistants, or the student body.49
A formal definition of amateurism was not released by the NCAA until
1916. It defined an amateur athlete as "one who participates in competi-
tive physical sports only for the pleasure and the physical, mental, moral
and social benefits directly derived therefrom."5 ° Even though a formal
definition was agreed upon, it was not until the 1950s with the creation
of the Committee on Infractions that the principles of amateurism began
to be strictly enforced. 51
The current NCAA Constitution lists that the basic purpose of the
association "is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of
the education program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between inter-
collegiate athletics and professional sports." 52 The NCAA maintains this
demarcation by allowing only amateur student-athletes to participate in
intercollegiate sports.53 Once students lose their amateur status in a par-
ticular sport, they are no longer eligible to participate in that sport,5 4
unless the NCAA grants a waiver or if the conduct falls within one of
the few exceptions spelled out in the bylaws.
49. MiTrEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 101 (citing IAAUS Bylaws, art. VI, 1906 Proc. at 33).
50. Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism Has Evolved over Time, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 3,
2000, http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2000/association-wide/debate%2Bon%2B
amateurism%2Bhas%2Bevolved%2Bover%2Btime%2B-%2B1-3-00.html. The defining of the
term "amateur" was highly debated within the NCAA. The NCAA decided to put forth a
definition in 1908, but agreement could not be reached on the definition until 1916. Id.
51. Id.
52. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art. 1.3.1. (Basic Purpose).
53. Id. at art. 12.01.1., 12.01.2.
54. Id. at art. 12.1.2.
55. Id. at art. 12.1.2.4. This section spells out the few exceptions to the amateurism rule.
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Article 12.1.2 provides a list of ways individuals can lose their
amateur status:
12.1.2 Amateur Status. An individual loses amateur status and thus
shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular
sport if the individual:
a) Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in
any form in that sport;
b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received fol-
lowing completion of intercollegiate athletics participation;
c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional
athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any considera-
tion received, except as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.5.1; (Revised:
4/29/10 effective 8/1/10)
d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of
expenses or any other form of financial assistance from a profes-
sional sports organization based on athletics skill or participa-
tion, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations;
e) Competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.4,
even if no pay or remuneration for expenses was received, except
as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1; (Revised: 4/25/02 effective
8/1/02, 4/29/10 effective 8/1/10)
f) After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a profes-
sional draft (see Bylaw 12.2.4); or (Revised: 4/25/02 effective
8/1/02, 4/24/03 effective 8/1/03)
g) Enters into an agreement with an agent. (Adopted: 4/25/02 effec-
tive 8/1/02)56
The most egregious and overarching of these banned activities is the
restriction on the use of a student athlete's skill for either a direct or
indirect financial gain. The remainder of this article will focus on the
way this restriction places a college athlete in a difficult and unjust
position.
III. COMPENSATION BASED ON THE SKILL OR
REPUTATION OF THE ATHLETE5 7
Student athletes cannot directly or indirectly use their athletic skill
for monetary gain. The most obvious form of monetary gain would be a
salary from the schools for playing in games. This article differs from
others previously written which advocate that the students should get
paid by either the schools or the NCAA for their participation in
These exceptions include prize money, payments based on team performance, insurance,
fundraising, training expenses, travel expenses, eligibility fees, equipment, and expenses relating
to participation in the Olympics. Id.
56. Id. at art. 12.1.2.
57. For the purposes of this article, employment will be considered under this subcategory.
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games.5 8 Student athletes, like all students, are able to be compensated
in the form of scholarships and grants. Student athletes on full scholar-
ships receive funding to cover their cost of attendance. This includes the
total cost of tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, trans-
portation, and other expenses related to attendance at the institution. 9
This places student athletes on an equal or greater playing field than
other non-athlete students who attend the same institution.
However, the NCAA bylaws go much further than just limiting
players from direct "pay for play" compensation. The bylaws place
restraints on athletes that put them at a disadvantage to non-athlete stu-
dents. The most egregious of these restrictions are those relating to stu-
dent employment. 60
A. Student Employment
The NCAA limits student athlete employment both by narrowing
the fields that students can work in and by fixing the rate at which the
students can be paid. Section 12.4 of the NCAA Bylaws permits student
athletes to obtain employment, but limits compensation for such
employment to being "only for work actually performed" and "at a rate
commensurate with the going rate in that locality for similar services. '"61
This is further qualified by outlawing any remuneration of the student
athlete based on the student's reputation, fame, or publicity even if this
would be of additional value to the employer.62 Student athletes can
offer athletic lessons and work in sporting goods stores, but cannot use
their names, pictures or appearances to attract individuals who would be
interested in lessons or in purchasing merchandise. 63 Lastly, students
may start their own businesses, but the students name, photograph,
appearance or athletics reputation cannot be used to promote the
business.64
58. See, e.g., Christian Dennie, Amateurism Stifles A Student-Athlete's Dream, 12 SPORTS
LAW. J. 221, 252-53 (2005) (suggesting the NCAA should provide student-athletes with financial
aid that covers the "actual cost of attendance"); Leslie E. Wong, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their
Profit: Ed O'Bannon Takes on the NCAA for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete's Right of
Publicity, 42 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1069, 1107 (2010) (Suggesting the court should establish a trust
fund for former student-athletes); Julia Brighton, The NCAA and the Right of Publicity: How the
O'Bannon/Keller Case May Finally Level the Playing Field, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 275,
289 (2011) (Suggesting that the NCAA should implement a trust system like the one used by the
United States Olympic Committee).
59. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art. 15.02.2.
60. Other prohibited methods of indirect compensation include restrictions on promotional
activities, Id. at art. 12.5., and financial donations from outside organizations. Id. at art. 12.6.
61. Id. at art. 12.4.1.
62. Id. at art. 12.4.1.1.
63. Id. at art. 12.4.2.1(f).
64. Id. at art. 12.4.4.
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These restrictions are unique to student athletes. Students who are
not under the restrictions of the NCAA can work wherever they want to
work, use their name to start a business, use their appearance to adver-
tise for a business (whether the business is their own or owned by some-
one else), and most importantly get compensated at whatever rate an
employer sees fit. A musician in a college band is not restricted from
getting paid more than other employees to work at the local music store,
if the employer feels that the musician's reputation would increase sales
or traffic into the store. The winner of the Miss University Pageant is not
barred from working at a local beauty salon because she may attract
more customers with either her good looks or reputation. These restric-
tions exist only for NCAA college athletes.
Student athletes are forced to sell themselves short in the employ-
ment market. Not only is this unfair to these students when compared to
others, these restrictions constitute an anticompetitive agreement which
violates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
B. Form 08-3a
Student athletes are required by the NCAA Constitution Article
3.2.4.665 and NCAA Bylaw 14.1.3.166 to sign Form 08-3a at the begin-
ning of each season. The form has seven parts, of which Part I and Part
IV relate to student employment and the use of a students' name, image,
or reputation.67
Part I of Form 08-3a requires student athletes to affirm that they
"meet the NCAA regulations for student-athletes regarding eligibility,
recruitment, financial aid, amateur status and involvement in gambling
activities" and that they "understand that if [they] sign this statement
falsely or erroneously, [they] violate NCAA legislation on ethical con-
duct and [they] will further jeopardize [their] eligibility. 68
65. Id. at art. 3.2.4.6. "Student-Athlete Statement. An active member shall administer
annually, on a form prescribed by the Legislative Council, a signed statement for each student-
athlete that provides information prescribed in Bylaw 14.1.3." Id.
66. Id. at art. 14.1.3.
Student-Athlete Statement. 14.1.3.1
Content and Purpose. Prior to participation in intercollegiate competition each
academic year, a student-athlete shall sign a statement in a form prescribed by the
Legislative Council in which the student-athlete submits information related to
eligibility, recruitment, financial aid, amateur status, previous positive-drug tests
administered by any other athletics organization and involvement in organized
gambling activities related to intercollegiate or professional athletics competition
under the Association's governing legislation. Failure to complete and sign the
statement shall result in the student-athlete's ineligibility for participation in all
intercollegiate competition. Id.
67. Form 08-3a, supra note 8.
68. Id. at Part I.
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Part IV of Form 08-3 requires student athletes to "authorize the
NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host institu-
tion, conference, local organizing committee)] to use [their] name or pic-
ture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events,
activities or programs. 69
IV. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF STUDENT EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
When examined under the framework of antitrust law, the NCAA
employment restrictions must be found to constitute an anticompetitive
agreement, of which the NCAA cannot proffer any legitimate procompe-
titive rationales.
A. Elements of a Sherman Antitrust Act Claim
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal." 7 Since nearly all contracts that bind
parties to a certain agreed course of conduct constitute some form of
restraint of trade, the Supreme Court has limited the restrictions con-
tained in section 1 to bar only "unreasonable restraints of trade."7 Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court has clearly defined two kinds of Sherman Act
violations: per se violations and ones that violate the rule of reason.7"
Per se violations occur "when surrounding circumstances make the
likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified
further examination of the challenged conduct."7 3 The per se rule only
pertains to practices that are void of any redeeming competitive ratio-
nales.74 Once found to be illegal per se, a court need not examine the
impact the practice has on the market or the defendant's procompetitive
justifications for the practice before finding a violation of antitrust law.75
Examples of per se violations include horizontal market division,7 6 hori-
69. Id. at Part IV.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
71. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 98,
104 S.Ct. 2948, 2959 (1984); see also Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010,
1016 (10th Cir. 1998).
72. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103; see also Law, 134 F.3d at 1016.
73. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103-04.
74. Law, 134 F.3d at 1016.
75. Id.
76. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). The Supreme Court held
that agreements between competitors to allocate territories to minimize competition are illegal. Id.
Topco had its members sign an agreement designating the territory in which they could sell
Topco-brand products. Id. Members could not sell products outside the territory in the agreement.
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zontal price-fixing7 7 and horizontal boycotts.78
If the agreement does not fall under a recognized per se violation,
the rule of reason test is used to determine if the restraint on trade is
"unreasonable."7 9 Under the rule of reason test, the initial burden is on
the plaintiff to show that the agreement had a "substantially adverse
effect on competition."80 If met, the burden then shifts to the defendant
to provide evidence of the procompetitive reasoning behind the alleged
wrongful conduct.8 If demonstrated, the plaintiff must then show that
the challenged conduct is "not reasonably necessary to achieve the legit-
imate objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a substan-
tially less restrictive manner."82 If all three steps are met, it must be
determined if the harms and benefits outweigh each other in order to
judge whether the challenged behavior passes the rule of reason test.83
B. The NCAA is Subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act
The NCAA previously was immune from federal antitrust actions
being brought against them, because the laws were "generally not appli-
cable to self-regulatory organizations with noncommercial goals. ''84
However, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,
the Supreme Court found that antitrust laws were applicable to the
NCAA University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia sued the
NCAA for antitrust violations based on the NCAA restricting the num-
ber of college football games televised each year and prohibiting mem-
ber institutions from contracting to have additional games broadcasted. 86
77. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 394 (1927). The Supreme Court
held that an agreement to fix prices is unlawful per se, regardless of whether the prices fixed are
themselves reasonable. Id. The case involved fixing and maintaining uniform prices for the sale of
sanitary pottery. Id.
78. F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990). The Supreme
Court held that a horizontal boycott, or an agreement between a group of competitors not to deal
with individuals or companies outside the group, was a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Id. The case involved an agreement between a group of attorneys to not work for wages that they
felt were too low. Id.
79. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 98
(1984); see also Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998).
80. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019; see also Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56
(2d Cir.1997).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Christine A. Burns, Potential Game Changers Only Have Eligibility Left to Suit Up for A
Different Kind of Court: Former Student-Athletes Bring Class Action Antitrust Lawsuit Against
the NCAA, 6 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 391, 403 (2011).
85. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85,
119-20 (1984).
86. Id. at 94.
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The Supreme Court found that by placing a ceiling on the number of
games televised, the NCAA was effectively engaging in horizontal
price-fixing, which would normally be a per se violation.87
However, since the NCAA would not be able to put forth a product
without horizontal restraints, the court instead analyzed the agreement
under a rule of reason analysis.88 In doing so, the court weighed the
anticompetitive consequences of the agreement, namely loss of freedom
to compete and higher prices and lower output than would exist were
there not an agreement,89 with the procompetitive reasons proffered by
the NCAA, namely to promote equality among member institutions and
to protect attendance at live games.9 ° The court held that the agreement
failed the rule of reason test and violated antitrust law since other less
restrictive options were available that would sufficiently preserve the
competitive balance between teams.91 Also, by protecting live attend-
ance the NCAA was choosing to protect one form of increasing revenue,
attendance at games, over another, revenue from television contracts.92
Further, the NCAA, in Law v. NCAA, was also found to violate
section 1 of the Sherman act when it limited individual's salaries. In
Law, the NCAA, in an effort to reduce costs, decreased the number of
coaches each sport was allowed to have.93 In doing so, it developed the
restricted-earnings coaches' rule (REC rule) under which entry-level
coaches could only make $16,000 a year.9 4 A class of basketball coaches
who were affected by the rule challenged the REC rule as a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.95 The NCAA did not contest that
the REC rule was the result of an agreement between its members,96 but
instead contested that the coaches could not define a relevant market.97
Using the same reasoning as Board of Regents, the Tenth Circuit
did not consider these horizontal restraints to be per se violations,
because restraints such as this are essential for the product to be availa-
ble at all.98 Instead, the court used the rule of reason test to determine if
the REC Rule violated antitrust laws. 99 The plaintiff therefore was
87. Id. at 100.
88. Id. at 101-02.
89. Id. at 105-06.
90. Id. at 114-15.
91. Id. at 119.
92. Id.
93. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1014 (10th Cir. 1998).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1012.
96. Id. at 1016.
97. Id. at 1019.
98. Id. at 1017-18.
99. Id. at 1019.
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required to show that the defendant had requisite market power within a
defined market or to show actual anticompetitive effect such as control
over price or output.' 00 Law did not have to show market power since
the court found price-fixing has obvious anticompetitive effects. 10' The
NCAA offered three procompetitive rationales, namely the desire to
retain positions, cost reduction, and maintaining competitive balance,
but the court rejected all three of these reasons.102 In terms of retaining
positions, the court found that nothing in evidence suggested that the
salary limits for the coaches would be effective at creating entry level
positions, since many positions were filled by experienced coaches.'
0 3
The court found no evidence that restricting coach's salaries would
reduce deficits, and even if there were evidence, mere cost saving does
not qualify as a defense under antitrust law."° Lastly, with regard to
maintaining competitiveness, the court found that it was not clear that
the REC rule would equalize the experience level of coaches, since there
was no evidence that the salary restrictions enhance competition, level
the playing field, or reduce coaching inequities. 01 Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit held that Restricted Earnings Coach Rule violated Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.10
6
C. Students-Athletes Have Standing to Sue the NCAA
In the past decade, players have increasingly brought claims against
the NCAA.' 017 This gate to the courts was opened by Jeremy Bloom
when he brought claims against the NCAA seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief requiring the NCAA to allow him to participate in col-
lege football at University of Colorado while continuing to receive
endorsements he earned as an Olympic Skier.'0 8 Although Bloom did
not bring antitrust claims against the NCAA and although he was unsuc-
cessful in his actions against the NCAA, 109 this case is significant
because of the resulting ruling regarding college athletes' standing to sue
the NCAA. The court determined that as an intended third-party benefi-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1020. The court terms this method of "proceeding directly to the question of
whether the procompetitive justifications advanced for the restraint outweigh the anticompetitive
effects" as the "quick look" rule of reason. Id.
102. Id. at 1021.
103. Id. at 1022.
104. Id. at 1023.
105. Id. at 1024.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P. 3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 740
F. Supp. 2d 658 (D.N.J. 2010); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., C 09-1967
CW, 2011 WL 1642256 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).
108. Bloom, 93 P. 3d at 622.
109. Id. at 628.
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ciary to the contractual relationship between the NCAA and its member
institutions, student athletes have standing to pursue claims against the
NCAA. 110
D. Applying the Rule of Reason Test to the Student Employment
Restrictions Found in Article 12.4 of the NCAA Constitution
For the same reasons that the Restricted-Earnings Coach Rule was
found to violate antitrust laws in Law v. NCAA, the restrictions on rates
at which the students may be compensated should also be found to vio-
late section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. As a result of the NCAA
Constitution, student athletes are required to sign Form 08-3a certifying
that they are bound by the NCAA bylaws."' This creates an agreement
that affects interstate commerce. By restricting the remuneration athletes
can receive from employment to "a rate commensurate with the going
rate in that locality for similar services," ' the NCAA is horizontally
fixing the price at which students can be paid. The reasons proffered by
the NCAA are not legitimate procompetitive rationales for these
anticompetitive employment restrictions.
1. A PER SE ANALYSIS WILL LIKELY NOT BE USED BY A COURT
WHEN EVALUATING THE EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
In both Board of Regents and in Law, the courts chose not to use a
per se analysis despite allegations of horizontal price-fixing which
would normally fall under the per se category. The reasoning against a
per se analysis is that the NCAA requires some horizontal restraints to
maintain the product of college sports. A per se analysis would result in
nearly every restriction of the NCAA being overturned, including those
regarding eligibility and academics. Instead, both Board of Regents and
Law advocate the use of the rule of reason analysis to determine whether
an antitrust violation occurs, allowing the court to weigh the anticompe-
titive effects against the procompetitive reasons in support of the act.
2. ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF THE STUDENT
EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
The first step in performing a rule of reason analysis is that the
plaintiff is required to show that an agreement had a substantially
adverse effect on competition, or was anticompetitive. 1 3 The plaintiff
110. Id. at 624.
111. See supra Part IH.C.
112. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art. 12.4.1(b).
113. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 113
(1984); Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998).
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therefore must show that the defendant had the required market power
within a certain market or show actual anticompetitive effect such as
control over price or output. 14 As in Law, this can be accomplished
through a "quick look" analysis, by showing "that a horizontal agree-
ment to fix prices exists, that the agreement is effective, and that the
price set by such an agreement is more favorable to the defendant than
otherwise would have resulted from the operation of market forces."" 5
Applied here, the restrictions on student employment rates clearly
represent an agreement between the NCAA and its member institutions.
Just as the NCAA did not dispute that the REC Rule was an agreement
among its members, 11 6 the classification as an agreement here likely
would not be contested by the NCAA. Form 08-3a, which the student
athletes are required to sign, binds the student athletes to the restrictions
set for in the NCAA Bylaws 1 7 and Bylaw 12.4.1(b) restricts the remu-
neration available to the student to the going rate for that particular type
of employment.
Although not as clear-cut of a horizontal restriction as limiting
coaches' salaries to $16,000 a year, as was the case with the REC
Rule,1"8 the 12.4.1(b) restriction still sets a cap on the amount students
can receive per hour from their employer. The cap does range depending
on the field and position that the student is employed in, but within the
same field and position of employment there is clearly a horizontal limit
on the rate at which students can be paid. This agreement effectively
ensures that students cannot get compensated at a higher rate than the
restriction allows. If a student were to receive compensation at a higher
rate than the norm in that field, the student would be ineligible, since per
the NCAA Bylaws, that student would no longer be considered an
amateur.
The 12.4.1(b) restriction is also more favorable to the NCAA and
its member institutions than it would have from the operation of market
forces. Again, although not as clear cut as member institutions not hav-
ing to pay more than $16,000 to retain a coach, these restrictions allow
the member institutions to compensate student athletes who work on
campus at a rate lower than market value and provide the member insti-
tutions with the benefit of being the only entity that can fully benefit off
of the attractiveness of having a student athlete as an employee.
Further, many student athletes either chose to obtain or are given
114. Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1016.
117. See supra Part II.C.
118. Law, 134 F.3d at 1012.
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jobs on campus. If students were able to market themselves to the height
of their marketability, then the schools would be forced to pay the stu-
dents what the market demanded for the student, rather than the going
rate for a non-athlete in that position. Outside employers would likely be
willing to pay student athletes at a higher wage than the wage they
receive at low-paying jobs on campus. This is because hiring student
athletes as employees can be advantagepus to a business. The company
who hires them can benefit from potential increases in traffic and atten-
tion, without the need to advertise or promote and depending on the field
can benefit from the unique knowledge the student athlete can provide to
customers.119
An example may be helpful. A local sporting goods store can hire a
student athlete, as can a campus book and apparel store. The operation
of market forces suggests that the sporting goods store would be willing
to pay the college athlete at a higher rate than a non-athlete employee,
since hiring the student athlete could potentially increase sales and cus-
tomers would likely be more willing to purchase equipment from some-
one who knows from experience about the equipment. But, by fixing the
rate at which these athletes can be compensated, the NCAA not only
denies the students this additional money that the market would demand,
but also, the campus store is given the competitive advantage since it
can pay the student less and still reap the full benefits from the ability to
use the student athlete to market their school.
Further, according to Board of Regents, such an in-depth analysis is
not necessary to determine that the employment restrictions are anticom-
petitive. "To the contrary, when there is an agreement not to compete in
terms of price or output, no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of the agreement."' 120 Again,
here it is highly likely that a court will find that an agreement does exist
and that the agreement results in elimination of market competition in
terms of the price paid to athletes at their place of employment.
3. POTENTIAL PROCOMPETITIVE REASONS THAT COULD BE
OFFERED BY THE NCAA
After the plaintiff has satisfied the initial burden of showing that
119. The NCAA clearly saw the likelihood and feasibility of employers paying student athletes
at a higher rate when they developed rule 12.4.1.1 of the NCAA Bylaws. The rule states that
"Such compensation may not include any remuneration for value or utility that the student-athlete
may have for the employer because of the publicity, reputation, fame or personal following that he
or she has obtained because of athletics ability." NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art.12.4.l.l.
(Athletics Reputation).
120. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 109
(1984) (internal quotations omitted).
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the agreement had an adverse effect on competition, the burden shifts to
the defendant to put forth legitimate procompetitive benefits of the
agreement.' 21 An anticompetitive agreement may still not be a violation
of antitrust under Section 1 of the Sherman Act if the procompetitive
benefits of the restraint outweigh or justify the anticompetitive effect. 122
The reasons provided by the defendant are only considered if they tend
to show that "the challenged restraint enhances competition."' 2 3 Applied
here to the employment restrictions found in 12.4.1(b), the only legiti-
mate rationales that could be recognized by a court in support of the
employment restrictions are those which are necessary to produce com-
petitive intercollegiate sports.
No such rationales can be successfully proffered by the NCAA with
regards to the 12.4.1(b) employment restrictions. The possible reasons
that the NCAA could offer include maintaining amateurism, equity
among schools or maintaining competitiveness, equity among players,
fear of abuse, and cost-reduction. None of these rationales outweigh the
anticompetitive effects of the agreement.
i. Maintaining Amateurism
The chief reasoning behind all of the NCAA's eligibility require-
ments is amateurism and courts have provided "ample latitude" when
reviewing these eligibility restrictions. In Board of Regents, the Supreme
Court recognized that certain horizontal restraints, such as rules of the
game and certain eligibility requirements, are justifiable under section 1
of the Sherman Act because they are vital to the continued existence of
intercollegiate athletics.' 24 Therefore, it is likely that the NCAA would
argue that the employment restrictions found in Rule 12.4.1 (b) should be
given deference as they are necessary eligibility requirements. As in
other cases, the NCAA would point to the desire to distinguish col-
legiate sports from professional sports and a desire not to become a
minor league training ground for professional sports. 12 5 By allowing stu-
dents to be compensated at a higher rate than other students, the NCAA
121. Law, 134 F.3d at 1021.
122. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113; see also Law, 134 F.3d at 1021.
123. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104; see also Law, 134 F.3d at 1021.
124. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
125. See Banks v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Upholding the no-draft and no-agent requirements of the NCAA since they would "turn amateur
intercollegiate athletics into a sham because the focus of college football would shift from
educating the student-athlete to creating a "minor-league" farm system out of college football that
would operate solely to improve players' skills for professional football in the NFL); McCormack
v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The NCAA markets
college football as a product distinct from professional football. The eligibility rules create the
product and allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures.").
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would argue that the emphasis on the academic part of the student ath-
lete would be greatly diminished.
But, as Justice Stevens noted in Board of Regents,
[C]onsistent with the Sherman Act, the role of the NCAA must be to
preserve a tradition that might otherwise die; rules that restrict output
are hardly consistent with this role. Today we hold only that the
record supports the District Court's conclusion that by curtailing out-
put and blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to con-
sumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the
place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation's life.' 2 6
By restricting the rates at which student athletes can be compen-
sated, the NCAA is doing the same type of curtailing that the Supreme
Court found violated antitrust laws in Board of Regents. Certain eligibil-
ity requirements such as the no-draft and no-agent rules provide this
necessary distinction between college and professional sports. However,
the employment restrictions are not the same type of eligibility require-
ment. Rule 12.4.1(b) allows students to get any job in any field. This
includes being a professional athlete in another sport. 127 By not limiting
the job, but instead limiting the compensation available for that job, the
NCAA is not protecting amateurism. Instead, it is "curtailing" the rate at
which these students can get paid and "blunting" the ability of employ-
ers to respond to the market's demand for these student athletes as
employees. Thus, on its face, this rule does not protect amateurism.
Further, as pointed out by Daniel E. Lazaroff, there are less restric-
tive means for the NCAA to promote the student athlete and maintain a
demarcation between amateur and professional sports. Lazaroff notes
that the NCAA "should realize that such a distinction [between college
and professional athletes] probably rests less on the question of compen-
sation and more on emphasizing the 'student' part of the student-ath-
lete." ' 28 NCAA efforts that focus on the academic aspects of student
athletes are less likely to create such antitrust issues 129 and therefore
would be a less restrictive means of protecting amateurism and the sanc-
tity of intercollegiate sports.
ii. Maintaining Equity Among Schools (Competitiveness)
Another main principle of the NCAA is the Principle of Competi-
126. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
127. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art.12.1.3. (Amateur Status if Professional in Another
Sport). "A professional athlete in one sport may represent a member institution in a different sport
and may receive institutional financial assistance in the second sport." Id.
128. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or
Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 368 (2007).
129. Id. at 369.
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tive Equity. 130 The NCAA could argue that these employment restric-
tions foster a level playing field between the universities. The argument
would likely allege that by allowing students to get compensated at rates
that reflect their athletic reputations, member institutions in bigger mar-
kets will be given an advantage over member institutions in smaller mar-
kets. This argument relies on the assumption that the larger markets have
larger and more established companies in them and that students will
choose schools located in these markets to fully benefit off of the ability
to market themselves in these cities. The NCAA would likely point to
schools in small markets, like Boise State University13 1 and Wake Forest
University, 132 and compare them to the schools in larger markets like
University of Southern California133 and University of Miami. 134
However, even if it were conceded that student athletes would be
attracted to schools in larger markets, it would be no different than the
current structure of the NCAA. The best student athletes go to the
schools with the best reputations in that sport, with the top programs
consistently getting the higher-rated athletes. 135 Further, students are
already compensated for employment at different levels depending on
where they live, with the average income in Massachusetts and New
York being much higher than the average income in Mississippi and
Arkansas.' 36 Thus, it is unlikely that lifting the employment restrictions
130. Id. at art. 2.10.
The Principle of Competitive Equity
The structure and programs of the Association and the activities of its members
shall promote opportunity for equity in competition to assure that individual
student-athletes and institutions will not be prevented unfairly from achieving the
benefits inherent in participation in intercollegiate athletics. Id.
131. Boise State University is located in Boise, Idaho. This is Boise State, BOISE STATE
UNIVERSITY, http://news.boisestate.edu/this-is-boise-state/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
132. Wake Forest University is located in Winston-Salem, North Carolina and has a total
university Enrollment of 7,079 students. Just the Facts, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, http://
admissions.wfu.edu/discover/facts.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
133. University of Southern California is located in Los Angeles, California. About USC,
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALimORNIA, http://about.usc.edu/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
134. University of Miami is located in Coral Gables, Florida. About Us, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI,
http://www.miami.edu/index.php/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
135. See, e.g., Team Football Recruiting Rankings, ESPN, http://insider.espn.go.com/college-
football/recruiting/classrankings (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). The following schools have been
ranked in the top 25 of football recruiting classes for each of the last 5 years: Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Ohio State, University of South California, Oklahoma, Norte Dame, Texas, LSU, Florida
State, Miami, Michigan, and Auburn. Id.
136. Median Household Income and Gini Index in the Past 12 Months by State and Puerto
Rico: 2009 and 2010, UNrrEo STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/prod/201 lpubs/
acsbrl0-02.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). The states with the highest average income in 2010
were Maryland and New Jersey and the states with the lowest average income were Mississippi
and Arkansas. Id.
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will result in a shift in the competitive balance of intercollegiate
athletics.
iii. Maintaining Equity Among Students
The NCAA may also contend that a system where athletes can be
given additional compensation based on their higher value in the market
would result in inequality among student athletes. They would likely
argue that the current system places each student athlete on equal foot-
ing and therefore creates the fairest venue for competition. If more popu-
lar student athletes were allowed to be paid more, it may create
resentment among players and disintegrate team unity.
However, the current system is in no way equal. For starters, not all
student athletes receive financial aid. Further, even for those who do, the
values can be set at different amounts (full, half, quarter, etc.). At certain
schools this could result in a financial gap between players of over
$160,000 throughout the four years at a university.137 Therefore, it is
unlikely that a court will find that maintaining equity among athletes is a
legitimate procompetitive rationale for the employment restrictions
imposed by the NCAA.
iv. Fear of Abuse
The NCAA could also argue that this would open the door for indi-
viduals to pay student athletes high dollar amounts to attend the schools
of their liking. However, it is highly unlikely that companies would be
willing to pay much higher than what they feel the true market value is
for an employee. Lifting these employment restrictions would not mean
that people could just pay large amounts of money to students. The com-
pensation of these student athletes would still be analyzed to ensure that
actual work is being performed. However, this analysis would also take
into consideration the additional value that the student athlete may
possess.
This argument is also not valid because the potential for abuse
already exists in the current system of student employment. This is espe-
cially true in fields of employment that involve student athletes who
receive tips or other forms of gratuity. Students who work as valets, taxi
drivers, or in the restaurant business receive a base pay which is moni-
tored by the NCAA, but it is impossible to keep track of what individu-
137. This gap varies depending on cost of tuition, with the gap at public schools being much
less than that at private schools. At University of Miami, the cost of tuition for the 2011-2012
school year came to $37,836 a year with the total price of admission ranging to over $50,000.
Non-athletic scholarships can also reduce this gap. Net Price Calculator, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI,
http://public.cgcent.miami.edu/AttendanceCalculator/Calculator.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
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als provide to these student athletes in the form of gratuity. The current
employment restrictions do not address the issue of disproportionate gra-
tuity, and therefore, the NCAA should not be allowed to proffer fear of
abuse as a legitimate procompetitive rationale. Rather, the employment
restrictions found in rule 12.1.4(b) deal with businesses, whose goal is to
make a profit. It is likely that an employer will pay only as much as
keeps the company profitable with respect to that employee.
v. Cost Reduction
A last ditch reason that the NCAA could offer is that by ensuring
that student athletes are not compensated higher than the rate at which
their position would normally call for, member institutions are able to
reduce costs. This argument would rely on the fact that the cost of pay-
ing student athletes who have on-campus jobs is lower with these
restrictions in place. However, Law v. NCAA makes it very clear that
"reducing costs for member institutions, without more, does not justify
anticompetitive effects ....,I38 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that such
a reason would be considered by a court reviewing the restriction.
Thus, it is clear that the NCAA's employment restrictions violate
antitrust law since the NCAA will not be able to proffer any legitimate
procompetitive reasons for the 12.4.1(b) employment restrictions. Even
if any of the above reasons is found to be a sufficient procompetitive
reason, the anticompetitive effects of the agreement significantly out-
weigh these procompetitive reasons.
V. EXAMINING THE EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS FROM OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF ANTITRUST LAW
Before discussing the suggested remedy for the antitrust violation,
an examination of how the employment restrictions place college ath-
letes at a disadvantage when compared to non-athletes may help to fur-
ther illustrate the injustice of the restrictions.
A. Comparison to Other Students
"The N.C.A.A. likes to conflate paying college athletes with the
issue of whether they would still be students. Students get paid all the
time." 39
Although the student athletes' stage, particularly for athletes in
sports like football and basketball, is not matched by any other group of
138. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998).
139. Joe Nocera, Let's Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2011, http:llwww.
nytimes.comI2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-athletes.html?pagewanted=all
(quoting Andy Schwartz, a litigation consultant interested in the economics of college sports).
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college students, a comparison with where other students stand provides
a unique perspective to an analysis of any NCAA rule. This is especially
helpful when one considers that the fundamental policy of the NCAA is
to maintain intercollegiate athletics as being an integral part of education
and the student body.'40 The NCAA and the member institutions pride
themselves on putting academics in front of athletics, which they claim
makes their product unique from professional sports.' 4 ' Yet, they do not
allow the student athletes the same employment rights as other students
who attend these member institutions.1
42
At any of the member institutions of the NCAA, undergraduate stu-
dents who are not athletes do not face any restrictions on employ-
ment. 43 Yet many of these students, like athletes, also have talents
outside of their academic ability that make them attractive in the job
marketplace. One such group of students is those who have talents in the
performing arts. As with most athletes, college is a necessary step in the
career of most aspiring musicians, actors, and artists. While bettering
themselves academically, college also provides an environment where
they can further develop their talents through classes, performances, and
lessons."44 Yet in pursuing their talents, they are not forced to abandon
other goals and options should their talents not lead them to a career.
A student athlete can provide lessons to others, just as an aspiring
student actor or actress is allowed to provide acting lessons. However, a
student actor or actress is free to advertise that he or she is providing the
lessons and use his or her image and reputation to seek out individuals
who might be interested in taking lessons. A student athlete, however,
cannot use his or her name, picture or appearance to promote the availa-
bility of lessons.' 45 This essentially limits student athletes to only being
able to provide lessons to individuals who approach them requesting
140. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art.1.3.1.
141. Id.; see also Id. at art. 2.4. (The Principle of Sound Academic Standards) (Requiring
academics to be a "vital component" of the student athlete).
142. This article is aware that the NCAA is not subject to constitutional claims of equal
protection, per the Supreme Court's ruling in Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S. 179 (1988). This section is meant to provide prospective, not to suggest that student athletes
have a constitutional claim against the NCAA.
143. Of course students have their academic requirements and commitments which they have
to work around, but there are no prohibitions on where they can work, how much they can make,
or what they can do to market themselves.
144. Pursuing performing arts while in college "can open doors to careers in such varied fields
as musical and theatrical performance, teaching, theater design, music publishing, arts
management, and stage managing." Performing Arts, EMMANUEL COLLEGE, http://www.
emmanuel.edu/Departments/Performing-Arts/Individualized-Major.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2012).
145. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art.12.4.2.1.
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their services. 46 For if they were to try to seek out individuals who
would be interested in lessons, they would be in violation of the employ-
ment restrictions put forth by the NCAA. 14 7
A student athlete can work at a local sporting goods store just as a
student musician can work at a local music store. The musician and the
musician's employer could use the musician's name, picture, or reputa-
tion as a great college musician to advertise for the business and increase
the number of sales by the musician and the store. Further, the employer
could pay the musician at any rate they saw fit. Not surprisingly, the
student athlete would be restricted from all of these things under Rule
12.4.2.3 of the NCAA's Bylaws.
48
B. Mark Zuckerberg and Michael Dell
Mark Zuckerberg invented Facebook as a college student at
Harvard University. His picture and information were used to create the
first profile on Facebook. His name was placed on the main page.
149
Thankfully for him there were no rules prohibiting him from profiting
off his own name or using his image to spark the growth of his
company.
Michael Dell, founder of Dell Computers, started his company
while he was freshman at University of Texas at Austin 5° . From his
dorm room on the Texas campus he compiled and sold upgrade kits for
computer systems.' 5 ' Again, thankfully for him, there were no rules
stopping him from starting his company while he was still a student.
Imagine that instead of just being brilliant students, Mark Zuck-
146. However even this may be considered using their reputation to promote lessons, since it is
likely that the individual is only approaching them because of their reputation as an athlete.
147. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art.12.4.2.1(f).
148. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art. 12.4.2.3.
Athletics Equipment Sales
A student-athlete may not be employed to sell equipment related to the student-
athlete's sport if his or her name, picture or athletics reputation is used to advertise
or promote the product, the job or the employer. If the student-athlete's name,
picture or athletics reputation is not used for advertising or promotion, the student-
athlete may be employed in a legitimate sales position, provided he or she is
reimbursed at an hourly rate or set salary in the same manner as any nonathlete
salesperson. Id.
149. Founder Bios, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?founderbios (last
visited Jan. 16, 2012). According to the founder biographies, Mark Zuckerberg and his roommates
invented Facebook while living in their dorm room at Harvard University. Id.
150. Michael S. Dell, DELL, http://content.dell.com/us/en/corp/d/bios/michael-dell-bio (last
visited Jan. 16, 2012).
151. Peter H. Lewis, The Executive Computer; Michael Dell Says He's More Than Ready for a
Good Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/05/business/the-
executive-computer-michael-dell-says-he-s-more-than-ready-for-a-good-
fight.html?ref=michaelsdell.
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erburg also played football at Harvard and Michael Dell also played bas-
ketball for the Texas Longhorns. They would have been faced with a
difficult decision with just two options. First, they could have pursued
their ambitions and started their companies. However in doing so, they
would have most certainly violated NCAA regulations. Zuckerberg's
name and image being on his website and Dell's last name being in the
company's title would have violated NCAA Bylaw 12.4.4 on self-
employment. 52 This is because Bylaw 12.4.4 states "A student-athlete
may establish his or her own business, provided the student-athlete's
name, photograph, appearance or athletics reputation are not used to pro-
mote the business."'' 5 3 Therefore, by starting their companies, they
would have been forced to forfeit their athletic careers.
The second option that would have been available to them was to
abandon their ideas and continue pursuing their athletic careers. This is
an unfair position to put student athletes in. For if Mark Zuckerberg and
Michael Dell were aspiring actors, musicians, poets, writers, lawyers,
doctors, or astronauts, they would not have faced any issues with start-
ing and attempting to develop their companies. In fact, if they aspired to
be anything other than athletes, they would have been allowed to con-
tinue in their pursuits. But if Mark Zuckerberg and Michael Dell were
aspiring athletes, Facebook and Dell Computers would not exist as we
know them. '54
VI. THE NCAA MUST ELIMINATE THESE EMPLOYMENT
RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENT ATHLETES
By limiting the employment compensation of student athletes, "the
NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate
athletics in the Nation's life."' 55 The NCAA bylaws restricting student
employment constitute an anticompetitive agreement between the
NCAA and its member institutions that is in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.' 56 This agreement places NCAA student athletes
at a disadvantage to fellow students at these member institutions by not
152. NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art. 12.4.4. While it is possible that Mark Zuckerburg
could have started Facebook without using his picture or his name and that Michael Dell could
have named the company something other than Dell, it is also possible that fear of violating
NCAA rules would have stopped them from pursuing the development of Facebook and Dell
Computers.
153. Id.
154. Once again, this is because, NCAA Bylaw 12.4.4 restricts student athletes from using
their name, photograph, appearance or reputation to promote and develop their own business.
NCAA Manual, supra note 5, at art.12.4.4.
155. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85
(1984).
156. See supra Part IV.D.2.
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allowing them to fully market themselves and by not compensating them
according to their true market value.'1 7 Therefore, the employment
restrictions must be lifted from these student athletes.
The NCAA's goals of maintaining amateurism and competition
should not be allowed to be used by the NCAA to place student athletes
in a position where they are not able to have access to a fair and equal
employment market. This is not to say that the NCAA should stop moni-
toring student employment altogether. Instead, the NCAA should con-
tinue to require student athletes to report who they are working for, what
their duties at that position entail, and the compensation that they will be
receiving. If the NCAA feels that there is some misconduct occurring
with either the compensation or the performance of the job, then the
employer and the student should be allowed an opportunity to explain
the disparity between what the NCAA believes the student should make
for such a position and what the employer is willing to pay that athlete.
In reviewing this explanation, the NCAA must be required to fully
weigh the athlete's value to that employer, including the additional value
that student's name and reputation offer to an employer.
In terms of self-employment, a similar reporting process must be
used, requiring the students to disclose the details of their employment.
The NCAA should not be allowed to restrict students from using their
name, image or likeness in the operation and promotion of their busi-
ness. Again, this does not mean that the NCAA should stop monitoring
student self-employment, but in doing so, the restrictions must be
reduced and the value of the student athlete's reputation must be
considered.
The NCAA claims that lifting these employment restrictions would
lead to the end of amateurism and the destruction of the college
brand.158 But as two leading sport economists, Andy Schwarz and Dan
Rascher, recently pointed out in a New York Times article, "Amateur-
ism has nothing to do with why fans love college sports. What draws us
to college athletics is that we love seeing students representing our
schools."'' 59 This would be just as true if student athletes were allowed
to be compensated for their employment at their full market value.
157. See Id.; see supra Part V.
158. See supra Part IV.D.3.
159. Nocera, supra note 139.
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